

MUSIC AS PRESENCE AND PRESENTIFICATION

A música como presença e presentificação

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Abstract

This paper proposes the possibility of music not being restricted solely as a way of symbolic representation but being mainly a method of making time alive, being a living *presence* capable of *presentifying* beings and essences.

Resumo

O artigo propõe que a música não é apenas um modo de representação, mas que ela é, antes de tudo, uma presença viva, um evento condutor de forças, capaz de *presentificar* seres e aspectos particulares dos seres.

Key-words: *representation; presence; make present; indigenous music; percussive music; music in music therapy.*

Palavras-chave: *representação; presença; presentificação; música indígena; percussão; música em musicoterapia.*

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"It is easy to understand how words refer to things,
but it remains obscure how and why sounds refer to being."
Victor Zuckerkandl

This work proposes that music is a presence in the outside world and that we relate to it as a presence, just like the presence of a living being.

I call "presentification" the characteristic of music interacting with people's being, stimulating it to manifest itself. It is the ability to make present, that is, to trigger the manifestation in a given moment and situation, of a being or entity that was not there before the music played; or even, to make manifest some aspect of a being or entity that was not previously manifested.

Although music is experienced as presence and manifestation in various situations, including in the context of music therapy, there is no structured academic argument for it to be recognized as a living presence. This work is a starting point in that direction.

The music philosopher Victor Zuckerkandl has approached this vision of music, especially in his later writings and lectures. His work underpins several lines of music therapy, such as Guided Imagery and Music (GIM) by Hellen Bonny (Bonny, 1978), the Nordoff-Robbins approach (Nordoff & Robbins, 1977; Robbins & Robbins, 1998), and music-centered music therapy (Brandalise, 2001; Aigen, 2005; Ansdell, 2014; Queiroz, 2019). However, I believe that the core of his vision of music has not yet been fully absorbed by music therapy.

In order to show that music is presence and capable of making present, I take as my starting point the music made by a Brazilian indigenous tribe, which uses only rattles in unison, without any rhythmic variation, to accompany its chants. I compare this use with that of Brazilian urban religious rites, Candomblé and Umbanda, in which music is a means for the manifestation of beings or entities. Finally, I compare it with classic cases of the Nordoff-Robbins approach and a case of music-centered music therapy, in which musical activity facilitates the manifestation of the child's being.

We attribute the quality of living presence exclusively to biologically living beings, not to something that is not biologically alive, such as music. In fact, music is not a biological being; therefore, it cannot be alive in that sense. However, we of the human species recognize in it a vibrationally alive being and thus interact with it.

At the beginning of his book *Music for Life*, music therapist Gary Ansdell evokes the statement by musician Charles Ives, "Music does not represent life: it is life." It may sound like a catchy phrase, but I understand that this is a fundamental definition of music.

Music as representation

In recent centuries, some thinkers in Western culture have considered music as representation. For Edouard Hanslick, it is the representation of movement found in the phenomenal world and in the human inner world; it is a "resonant copy of the great movements of the universe" (1994, p. 107). For Susanne Langer, "the tonal structures that we call music have an intimate logical resemblance to the forms of human feelings" (1980, p. 28). For her, "the function of music is not the stimulation of feeling, but the expression of it; and, moreover... a symbolic expression" (p. 30). Leonard Meyer identifies two perspectives: one in which "musical meaning is found exclusively within the work itself" (1984, p. 1) and another in which music communicates meanings that "refer to the extramusical world of concepts, acts, emotional states, and characters" (p. 1). In both perspectives, music represents something, whether in self-reference or referring to something external.

Music, as a form of representation, is linked to being considered a language. A language different from verbal discourse, but still a representation just like verbal language. The structure of verbal discourse is so striking that it leads thought to consider other human manifestations as being similar to it.

Music psychologist Geza Révész states that music originated in moments when speech was insufficient to reach a distant interlocutor, thus giving rise to intoned speech, which, according to him, increases its sonic power and reach. From intoned speech were born the intervals of musical tones and, consequently, from shouted babblings, music originated (2001, p. 231). Music would be a consequence or variation of speech. More recent authors share Révész's view and consider the creation of music by the human species as a consequence of strictly biological needs (Arom, 2000; Geissmann, 2000; Slater, 2000).

Although,

The attempt to interpret music as a consequence of primal cries of defense or mating, as argued by Révész and other authors who base their view of music on a biological need, does not hold up – it is not necessary to create a musical system for this; animals resolve their needs without creating a musical system, although they make sounds that are effective for their purposes and, sometimes, pleasant to us humans (Queiroz, 2017, p. 171).

This main strand of Western thought on music could be one way of experiencing and thinking about music. However, within Eurocentric culture, it has taken primacy as the sole mode. I do not deny this possibility nor do I consider it delusional. Its use can bring it closer to language, especially when there are representational systems associated with it: the lyrics of a song or opera libretto, the program of a symphonic piece, and the music associated with stage performances.

Music considered a representation is generally presented to an audience. Historically, considering it a representation is linked to making music a presentation by musicians to audiences who receive and listen to it. The sense of symbolic representation, as in linguistics, brings the division proposed by Roman Jakobson (2003, p. 74) between sender, message, and receiver. In the case of music, this includes the musician, the music, and the audience.

The view that music is made by specialists and directed at an audience presupposes a boundary between musicians and audience, between those who make music because they possess the attributes to do so, and those who receive it as merely passive spectators. In his work **Man the Musician**, Zuckerkandl (1976, p. 11) challenges this view. For him, not only does such a boundary not exist in music, but it is “the most natural solvent of the artificial boundaries between being and others, just as language is most apt and useful for expressing all sorts of distinctions and differences between them” (1976, p. 51).

The separation between musician and audience is implicit in much of the music we encounter. It encompasses classical and popular music, concert halls and music that entertains crowds, visitors to folk music events, and researchers listening to music from a culture different from their own. In all of these, the boundary between musician and audience imposes a vision on music: it presents something to someone.

We listen to music made by other cultures in the same way we receive music from the Western tradition: as something that is presented to us and, consequently, that represents something else. Someone trained by the Western worldview, when listening to any music, including that of another culture, carries that worldview with them and uses it to interpret what they hear.

Ethnomusicology followed the same line of thought. In a commentary on Merriam's text, *The Anthropology of Music*, the anthropologist Tiago Pinto summarizes the concept of music "as a means of social interaction, produced by specialists (producers) for other people (receivers)" (2001, p. 224). Or, in Merriam's own words:

Music is a uniquely human phenomenon that exists only in terms of social interaction; it is made by people for other people and is a learned behavior. It does not exist and cannot exist by, of, and for itself; there must always be human beings doing something to produce it (1964, p. 27).

Naturally, wherever there is music, there are human beings making and listening to music. However, there is not necessarily a separation between making and listening to music.

Music as nonverbal communication is present in music therapy in Benenzon's (1988) music therapy model, which considers it a nonverbal language that enhances the patient's communication with the therapist, with themselves, and with the world.

Music as an aesthetic form

Music therapist Kenneth Aigen (2007) developed the concept of music in music therapy acting as an aesthetic form, based on the ideas of John Hospers, David Elliot, and John Dewey. Aigen emphasizes the role of music as a form of self-improvement – Elliot defines it as self-growth (1995, p. 115) – through the sensitive cognition achieved in contact with music. Aigen states that "the aesthetic experience accounts for the search for meaning" and "the aesthetic experience provides a connection with a fundamental reality that exists outside" (2007, p. 126, our translation). For him, "the aesthetic experience is only possible because humans are aesthetic beings" (p. 127). For him, the aesthetic form is expressed and acts in music education, in the music therapy context, and in art.

The concept of aesthetics is at the heart of Aigen's thinking on music in music therapy: the forces contained in the aesthetic form of music relate directly to the human being, without them being symbolic or representing anything. Beauty is the meaning carried by music, which brings meaning to human experience.

For Brynjulf Stige, the view of music as aesthetics in music therapy is quite relative. He states "that there is a radical indeterminacy of aesthetic concepts" (2008, p. 26, our translation). The aesthetic nature depends on the cultural environment in which it is experienced, a theme extensively developed in the book *Culture-centered Music Therapy* (2002).

Henk Smeijsters argues that considerations about the aesthetic form of music are not necessary for it to interact meaningfully with people. Analogy is what integrates musical and human meanings, individually and socially. For him, "analogy suggests that the personal and social meanings of music occur because there is a correspondence between what is happening in the musical process and what is happening in the person and the community" (2008, p. 23). Smeijsters considers, like Langer, that music is an analogue of emotional life, although he extends the analogy beyond emotion.~

Paul Nordoff used the most refined, therefore aesthetic, music in his work. However, he did not consider music in music therapy as merely aesthetic. Nordoff cites Zuckerkandl's concept, "listening to music means listening to an action of forces" (1973, p. 37) when describing to his students (in the *Talks on Music* course, later published as the book *Healing Heritage*) how musical notes act in music therapy work: "When talking about musical tone, he [Zuckerkandl] says that every tone is 'an event' (p. 12). Isn't that a wonderful concept! A tone is 'an event'" (Robbins & Robbins, p. 32).

However, Aigen, when commenting on Nordoff's work, speaks of music as aesthetics: "An essential component of the Nordoff-Robbins approach is direct participation in the creation and experimentation of aesthetic forms" (Aigen, 1998, p. 236, our translation). He further states that Nordoff relied on Zuckerkandl's concepts for "ideas that could serve as a basis for linking music therapy models that are based on conceptions of aesthetic form" (p. 244).

Aigen softens the radicalism of Zuckerkandl's thought by stating that music is its aesthetic form. In contrast, Zuckerkandl asserts that aesthetics has nothing to say about music: "the [aesthetic] concepts, rooted in philosophical systems and their requirements, are not native to the tonal world; musical experience nowhere suggests them" (1973, p. 14, our translation). Zuckerkandl also states that "tones are events in the external world" (p. 12) and that "musical tones are conductors of forces" (p. 37). The concept of music as a conductor of forces formed the basis of Paul Nordoff's clinical practice and is close to what I call presence and presentification.

Music as participation and communion

In the 1960s, Zuckerkandl defined musicality not as an attribute of only a few talented individuals, but as an attribute of the human species: "it is not the prerogative of a select few, but an endowment of man as man" (1976, p. 8). For him, music, in its beginnings, was not created by specialists separate from others. Musical manifestations of various peoples around the world bear witness to this. Even the manifestations of so-called folk music, within the territory of Western culture, testify to music made by all for all, without division between specialist musician and passive audience. He exemplifies his thought with a situation that, although it seems to demonstrate division, shows music as communion.

O canto gregoriano é algo inteiramente diverso; é uma oração – um louvor, uma súplica, uma ação de graças – uma oferenda e não algo recebido. Dar e receber mudaram seus lugares; se há um recebedor este é o homem em cuja mente a melodia primeiro toma forma. Longe de pensar em si mesmo como um compositor, ou ainda como humilde artesão, ele vê a si próprio como tendo sido agraciado com o dom de ser capaz de ouvir os anjos cantando; tudo que ele faz é anotar os sons concedidos a ele pelos céus. Então, a melodia ecoa durante o serviço divino, cantado pelo sacerdote ou pelo coro, nada mais distante da mente de qualquer pessoa do que a ideia de música executada para uma audiência. A melodia será cantada quer alguém esteja escutando ou não, e se há ouvintes eles não são uma audiência, mas uma congregação. Eles se reuniram não para ouvir, mas para venerar. O cântico não é cantado para eles, mas por eles, em seu favor. A divisão em cantores e ouvintes permanece na superfície, debaixo da qual todos eles, cantores e ouvintes se assemelham, são um. Somente no mais óbvio sentido físico os sons vêm ter aos ouvintes a partir do lado de fora deles; a verdadeira fonte está dentro dos ouvintes (p. 12-13).

Zuckerlandl introduces the concept of music as a shared experience. It doesn't matter if everyone involved produces the music or if some of them only listen to it. Music is not primarily about performance or communication, but about union and communion. When there is music, there is integration between subject and object, between subject and subject. For him, music is a solvent that triggers the self-abandonment of the subject to an experience, the dissolution of barriers; it is union and oneness (p. 24).

John Blacking, based on his fieldwork, poses the same question about musicality: “we must ask why seemingly general musical abilities should be restricted to a select few” (2000, p. 4), adding: “must the majority be made ‘unmusical’ so that some may become more ‘musical’?” (p. 4). He also states that ethnomusicology has reevaluated musical systems “but has not yet led to a reevaluation of human musicality” (p. 4, our translation).

In later work, Blacking, studying the “effectiveness of musical symbols” (1995, p. 175), reaffirms that “music is always a social fact” (p. 177), and that the relationship between music and people is mediated by the sociocultural context, because...

If the tension of the tone and the ideal movement of the music portray nervous tension and motor impulse and stimulate emotional experience, it is because people have learned to make the connections. Connecting musical experience and performance to everyday life begins at a very young age (p. 177).

Blacking believes that music is made by everyone for everyone, however he says it is a constructed representation: it exists because its meanings are constructed by the people who use it (p. 179). For him, music is representation and what it represents is not an absolute given, as it depends on the sociocultural context in which it is constructed. This thought is similar to that of Stige.

Ethnomusicologist Thomas Turino, in analyzing the politics of participation in music, states that the signs of music, that is, its abstract representation, “create a special space for making imaginative connections” (2008, p. 7). Drawing on Charles Peirce's ideas about the connections between the sign and what it represents, he considers music as representation. However, for him, the abstract space composed of music is divided into two categories, defining them as participatory and presentational music.

In short, participatory performance is a special type of artistic practice in which there are no artist-audience distinctions, only participants and potential participants playing different roles, and the main objective is to involve the maximum number of people in some performance role. Presentation performance, on the other hand, refers to situations in which one group of people, the artists, prepare and provide the music for another group, the audience, who do not participate in the music or dance (p. 26).

Turino also expands the field of music beyond performance. He understands, like Blacking and Zuckerkandl, that there is something important and profound in participating in the making of music. However, Zuckerkandl states that music is born from participation more properly than from mere possibility, and also that music is present in many different purposes, but that

There is a common element to all these diverse expressions of the need for self-abandonment, and this is not a distancing from the self, not a negation, but an expansion, an improvement of the self, a breaking down of the barriers that separate the self from things, the subject from the object, the agent from the action, the contemplator from what is contemplated: it is a transcendence of this separation, its transformation into a union (Zuckerkandl, 1976, p. 23).

For Zuckerkandl, music is present – or born – when the human species experiences union with something or other. The need for participation – or, more properly, communion – would thus be the very cause of music's existence. If this genesis was lost in the course of Western history, it does not affect what Zuckerkandl points out: music as the principal human achievement for the experience of communion.

This approach to music relates to several approaches in music therapy, such as the culture-centered approach proposed by Stige, the music-centric music therapy proposed by Brandalise and Aigen, and the Nordoff-Robbins approach itself.

Music as a musical activity

Another approach to music asserts that the act of making music is more significant than the final product, the musical work. It places its meaning in the act of being produced, and not in the final product nor solely in the relationship of the final product with humans. This is what the musician and ethnomusicologist Christopher Small states: “the fundamental nature and meaning of music are not in the objects, nor in the musical works, but in the action, in what people do” (1998, p. 8) when they make music. He shifts the concept of music to a doing, a human action (without confining it to the realm of

language, the aesthetics of art, or the significant symbol). He concludes that when we talk about music, “we could say that it is not so much about music as about people musicking” (p. 9, our translation). The word he proposes is a neologism, “it is a very useful conceptual tool not to be used. It is the present participle, or gerund, of the verb to make music” (p. 9).

Small proposes the following definition: “musicking is participating, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by playing, listening, rehearsing or practicing, providing material for performance (what is called composition) or dancing” (p. 9, our translation). And he proposes “a framework for understanding all musicking as a human activity, for understanding not only how, but why participating in a musical performance acts in such a complex way in our existence as individual, social and political beings” (p. 12).

Stige introduced the concept of musicking to music therapy. He states that making music (musicking) is a phylogenetic attribute of human beings, “a basic element in the human capacity for nonverbal communication” (2002, p. 82), and considers music to be both the act of making it and the object made.

Music can be considered both a situated event and an activity. As an event, music sounds in time, organized as culturally informed expressions of human protomusicality. As an activity, music is the act of creating and relating to emergent sounds and expressive gestures (p. 82).

Music is the act of making it, the process of producing it, the sociocultural interactions that arise in making it – and because of which it is made – and is an expression of musicality as an inherent human trait. The act of making music is an event in the outside world: the presence of those who make music and the presence of the music itself being made.

Gary Ansdell states that “the powers of music are essentially a mirror of our individual and social powers and, as such, depend on our ongoing ability to perceive and cultivate them” (2014, p. 298, our translation). This thought summarizes the concepts of music as a collective act, as an event in the external world, and as an event that contains an analogy with the human experience. He resolves the many concepts presented so far regarding music into a single equation. Throughout his book **How Music Helps in Music Therapy and Everyday Life**, he attempts to construct and present this equation.

Turino's concept of participatory and performance music, and Small's concept of music as musical practice, may have renewed the vision of music for those immersed in the environment of Western classical music. However, for those who participate in musical manifestations, such as those found in Brazilian culture, nothing is more intuitive than considering music as a participatory process of making music. These concepts naturally arise from contact with music in cultures on the periphery or outside of Eurocentrism. Although they approach the vision I intend to present, they lack a step in understanding music.

Music as a manifestation

We find other music, other musical practices, and other musicality in musical expressions performed outside the patterns of Eurocentric culture; that is, in music made by other peoples, in other sociocultural interactions, and with other perspectives on it.

The music made by indigenous cultures in Brazil bears witness to this other kind of music. Besides presenting characteristic musical forms, partly distinct from Western tonality, they show a different meaning in how these peoples make music.

Anthropologist Anthony Seeger lived for many years with the Kîsêdjê Indians of Brazil, who live in the state of Mato Grosso. Their songs caught his attention, and he dedicated his book *Why the Kîsêdjê Sing* (2015) to them. This book comes with a DVD containing recordings of songs, dances, and testimonies from this people, especially recordings of the Rat Festival made by Seeger and the Kîsêdjê themselves.

Seeger's work aims to understand the set of interactions in musical practice, that is, in the musicking of the Kîsêdjê. Seeger adopts a point of view for the anthropology of music, which "addresses the way in which music is part of culture and social life" (2015, p. 14, our translation).

The Kîsêdjê (formerly known as Suyá) lend themselves to a musical anthropology because central aspects of their social life are constructed from musical ceremonies and performances, and because they have the custom of defining themselves as a group based on certain genres of songs and body ornaments, which they associate with the production of sounds and attention to them. The sonic transparency of their community makes their village a concert hall, the seasonal organization of songs makes their year a series of concerts (or a single musical piece), and the rites of passage make their lives a process punctuated by transformations that occur over extended periods of singing. (p. 15)

For these people, says Seeger, “singing is associated with ceremonies that men learned from ancestral spirits when they walked the earth, and music makes possible a return to and renewal of the sacred past” (p. 34).

Throughout the lowlands of South America, as far as we know, music is used to represent and create a transcendence of time and substance; past and present are linked, humans and non-humans communicate and commune. To a certain extent, time and the potential of myth are re-established in the present by the sound of flutes, rattles, and voices (p. 35).

He presents a detailed description of the Kîsêdjê chants, their interrelations with speech, and how they are present in rituals and daily life. He describes and records the presence of chant and speech in the Rat Festival, "a rite of passage in which a boy begins his initiation into masculine activities" (p. 27).

The book is dedicated to the songs of this people, starting with the title itself. Seeger says little about instrumental music and the instruments used, and explains the predominance of singing over any instrumental use in the following way.

Given the importance of the ears, hearing, and morality, and of the mouth, speech, and masculinity, it becomes easier to appreciate the importance of instruction, oratory, invocation, and song. To a certain extent, the correlation between these groups of concepts related to speech and hearing also explains why the Kîsêdjê did not develop a very strong interest in instrumental music. The voice is their most important musical instrument, and the main object of critical evaluation, and the word (materialized in song) was an essential aspect of knowledge. Although the Kîsêdjê had known the flutes of the Upper Xingu peoples for more than a century, they did not adopt the flutes or flute music as part of their permanent repertoire, as they did with Upper Xingu songs. Nor did they adopt any non-indigenous instrument (p. 167).

Apparently, there is really little to discuss. The Kîsêdjê only use rattles to accompany their singing, and Seeger makes little reference to them in his analysis.

The only types of instruments that the Kîsêdjê played regularly were rattles. With the rattle, the body itself becomes the instrument. The rattles were held in the hands, with straps behind the knees, attached to belts and worn on the back. They were made from animal hooves, fruit pits, gourds, rifle bullet casings, and small metal bells (page 167).

The limited references result from a Western perspective on musical thought: compared to the magnificence of ‘our’ music, the seemingly simple use of the Kîsêdjê rattles sounds less important. For ‘us’, their melodies have greater color and musical interest; the meaning of the sung words and the way of singing have a variety and richness

that are more apparent from a Western point of view. Furthermore, what these chants represent in their lives, the social and cultural fabric that leads them to sing them, and the communication that occurs between individuals and the entire tribe through the chants seems consistent with the preeminence given to them. At least, that's how it is from the perspective of those studied through Eurocentric parameters.

However, watching the video of the Rat Festival, recorded by the Kîsêdjê, I find the use of the rattles remarkable. They are used throughout in unison: struck in time with the steps, generally with a firm stamp of the right foot on the ground.

While watching the video, the viewer will notice this practice at various points. Select some of them from the video's timing (Track 1, *Amtô: A Festa do Rato*, 2015): from 7'50 to 8'30, from 9'30 to 10', from 10'15 to 11'30, from 22'35 to 25'30, from 25'45 to 27'50, from 28'40 to 30'15, from 31'25 to 32'35 and from 33'30 to 37'30. Almost every time the Kîsêdjê play the rattles, they do so in unison, accompanying the stamping of their right foot on the ground, a technique they give special emphasis to in ritual dances.

When mentioning the use of rattles, Seeger notes that they are shaken along with the step: "carrying rattles... they rose and fell with the stamping of their feet" (p. 100); "with rattle straps on their knees, gourds hanging by threads on their backs, clashing with each step..." (p. 207); "with a stomp and a shaking of the rattles" (p. 225); "the singers begin to shake their rattles, stamp their feet and murmur their call-songs" (p. 226); "and, for moments, they just stamp their feet and shake their rattles in the dark" (p. 232). These are the mentions that Seeger makes of the sound of the Kîsêdjê rattles.

It's not the production of an exceptional rhythm, it's not virtuosic use, it's not a counter-rhythm that enriches the singing, there's no polyrhythmic richness (so dear to our view of the music of pre-literate cultures), there isn't even a variation in the rhythmic use of the rattles. The whole thing seems insignificantly poor.

A musician trained in Western music will rightly see little or nothing in rattles as a musical contribution, as a process or product, as a representation or communication of something. Even as musicking, it seems uninteresting due to the lack of differentiation in what it does. It passes very well as a poor and simplistic accompaniment for a culture whose music is rudimentary and has not yet learned what musical sophistication can offer.

Another perspective may come to the rescue regarding the value of the repetitive and unison percussion of the Kîsêdjê rattles: precisely the continuous repetition is the element to be considered, due to its monotonous and hypnotic effect. Some authors consider monotonous percussion to cause neurological alterations. Neher was the first to present this possibility based on his research (1962), stating that monotonous percussion induces modifications in the emission of brain waves. Although the ethnomusicologist Gilbert Rouget (1985, p. 175) contested Neher's conclusions, Csaba Szabó conducted other experiments and, based on them, affirms that "the alteration of consciousness during the listening to percussion is very similar to the alteration of hypnosis" (2006, p. 58), concluding that "hearing percussion strongly and effectively influences subjective experiences" (p. 59). The continued repetition of the Kîsêdjê percussion is believed to have a neurological effect on the ritual participants, inducing a trance or altering their consciousness, which is the reason for its percussion.

Although there may be significant neurological stimulation in continuous isochronous rhythm, and this rhythm may carry socially constructed symbolism, it is neither the acoustic-physiological effect nor the symbolism that makes the Kîsêdjê always practice their percussion in the same way, marking the beat of their right foot on the ground while walking forward or backward, while they march in place, while they sing their songs.

Watching the video recordings, the impression is that the sound of the rattle, along with the steps, enhances the present moment of what they sing and dance. They are very seriously committed to the task of performing their rite, evoking the presence of animals, such as the rat, and the sound of the rattle with each step reinforces what they are doing. The rattle is played for no other reason than the sonic-musical reinforcement of bringing to the present moment what the ritual and the singing evoke. The feeling that the present time presents itself at every moment, as if in portions, one after the other, is reinforced by the strong footwork marked with the use of the rattles. The present time is enlivened. At the moment of each present moment, the rattle sounds, the right foot strikes the ground noisily, affirming the effective presence of what they are doing, of what is sung and evoked.

This instrumental accompaniment precedes any symbolism. It is not music that aims to represent something; there is no symbolic code. It evokes the awakening of consciousness to the present. There is no brain stimulation that leads to a lowering of consciousness, trance, or altered state of mind. Nor is it mere adornment, given the effort involved in producing, dressing, and setting up so many rattles to sound, as can be seen in the video recording. There is a meaning in the sound, marked step by step at each moment sung in the Rat Festival.

The repeated sound of the rattle marks the present time, at each step, at each moment lived in the rite. The rhythmic-musical sound of the rattle makes the time present. It makes present the presence of the animals that are sung about, of each situation and of the content experienced in each stage of the rite. This aspect of Kîsêdjê music does not allude to something nor does it represent something. It does not represent an idealized time, it is not information about time, it is not time placed in an aesthetic form. It is time itself made alive and present and, consequently, capable of making present what is being evoked.

There is no room in Western thought for the considerations presented here. Why would it be necessary to use a musical device to make something present? Something is either present or it is not; it is either there or it is not; that is what intuitive Western thought says. Through musical artifice, this something could, at most, become present in the subjectivity of individuals, which would return music to representing or symbolizing – and the proposition of making something present would be meaningless, since nothing is actually present simply because music has been played.

Psychologist Benny Shannon also uses the word "presentational," contrasting it with "representational." But he doesn't do so in the same sense that I propose. For Shannon, the presentational is a form of cognition, only closer to the body and psychological processes than mental representation (2013, Epilogue, p. 2, our translation). What he postulates for the term "presentification" is not exclusively intellectual, but it is still a mode of intellection and not phenomenal presence. What I propose is not a special mode of cognition in the face of music, but that music is the phenomenon of a presence. When music plays, a reality becomes present.

When Seeger presents the Kîsêdjê's own interpretation of what happens in the ritual, what they recount is quite different from Western thought:

I asked several men if the singers transformed into rats at the Rat Festival, and they all answered yes. During the night, everyone was a rat (and men too). This transformation is one of the high points of the entire ceremony. ... Then, as animals, they leave their “forest village” towards the human village (p. 227).

What we see in the video recording are men returning from the forest to their village; they are not rats, nor are they half-rat men, although physical gestures and action strategies suggest something of the rat's nature, as Seeger notes: “the silent entry into the house through the back wall is like that of the rat” (p. 227), which enters secretly. But, visibly and tangibly, they are men pretending to be rats, which keeps us in the realm of representation, of one thing representing another. Many will say: there are only men pretending to be rats; what imagination!

The Kîsêdjê refer to the presence of a ‘rat spirit’ and not a physical rat that has merged with their bodies. The ‘rat spirit’ for Western thought is a purely subjective concept (it is an imagination). The rat spirit for the Kîsêdjê is a reality as visible and tangible as their physical bodies and the forest where they dance.

We find this same type of worldview in other peoples. Seeger takes an example close to the Kîsêdjê, the Bororo people, their neighbors, who maintain the “firm insistence that they were macaws” (p. 227). And he states that “the Kîsêdjê are rats, just as the Bororo are macaws: in a certain context, and as an expression of ambiguity. Outside the Rat Festival, the question ‘are you a man or a rat?’ makes no sense whatsoever; in the ceremonial context, the answer is ‘yes’” (p. 227).

According to Western thought, it is impossible to be both man and rat. Such a statement is a contradiction or absurd – even more so when one has the physical evidence of sight that makes one see men dancing poorly and awkwardly as imitations of rats.

Aristotelian logic, the basis for scientific thought, states that ‘if A is A, and B is B, then A is not B, cannot be B’. Aristotelian thought defines identity as both equality and difference: I am I, the other is the other. That which is different cannot be equal. What is different from me is not me, is not present in me: it can only be the other. It is the concept of unitary identity, equal only to itself and necessarily equal to itself (2014, 998b, 20-30).

Locke draws on Aristotle to conceptualize identity for legal and social purposes, primarily to define what property is. He defines the notion of identity as "an intelligent thinking being, possessing reason and reflection, and capable of considering himself as himself, the same thinking thing in different times and places" (1995, p. 246, our translation).

Within the Western view of identity, where identity is defined as being equal to oneself, men are men, rats are rats, men are not rats. A man cannot be a rat, even if in his subjectivity he feels or thinks he is one, or even if he embodies the essence of a rat.

Seeger seeks a meaning for the Kîsêdjê's assertion, which is diametrically opposed to Aristotelian logic. He proposes that

When they become both men and rats, the men are removed from the space and time of everyday activity. Their identity refers to the time of the myth itself, and "encloses a paradox"... insofar as they will be creatures of the courtyard and the periphery at the same time [alluding to the fact that the rats come from the forest to the village, a transition like that of the boy who will become a man, for whom the Rat Festival is directed]. It is this kind of radical juxtaposition of different times and spaces that gives these moments their conceptual and emotional power. The evening transformation of men into men/rats has parallels with rites of passage throughout the world (p. 229).

It is not uncommon in the formulations of thought in other cultures for the self and the other to be interchangeable or, at least, to be defined in terms different from Western logic. For another Brazilian indigenous people, the Kaxinawa, "there is ambiguity regarding the definition of boundaries between 'self' and 'other'" (Lagrou, 2002, p. 29) and this ambiguity is an "insoluble paradox: the only way to conceive it is to become oneself, 'other'" (p. 33). They have found "modes of 'mimesis' and transformation, different ways of 'shedding one's skin'" as a way of dealing with otherness, which for them "is nothing more than preparation for the final journey" (p. 33). The transformation of oneself into another is not foreign to various cultures. It is foreign, however, to Western culture, which considers it mere imagination, unreality, or illness. For this [person], the presence of an 'other' where previously there was only an 'I' results from the confused interpretation made by unprepared minds.

The Brazilian anthropologist Viveiros de Castro describes the shift in perspective as characteristic of indigenous thought in tribes from the central and northern regions of Brazil, which he called perspectivism. The starting point for this reflection was...

Indigenous conception according to which the way human beings see animals and other subjectivities that populate the universe – gods, spirits, the dead, inhabitants of other cosmic levels, plants, meteorological phenomena, geographical accidents, objects and artifacts – is profoundly different from the way these beings see humans and see themselves (2017, p. 303-04).

According to Castro,

This conception is almost always associated with the idea that the manifest form of each species is an envelope (a “garment”) hiding an inner human form, normally visible only to the eyes of the species itself or to certain transspecific beings, such as shamans. This inner form is the spirit of the animal: an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to human consciousness, materializable, so to speak, in a human bodily scheme hidden beneath the animal mask (pp. 304-05).

The notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are neither stable nor do they have fixed and defined boundaries, as in the Western conception. From this point of view, being a rat or a macaw and being human at the same time, that is, the transition or overlap between identities, is not a contradiction or an anomaly. It is a possibility. The perspectivism postulated by Castro shows how it is possible to be both rat and human. A can be A, just as it can be B, and, furthermore, A can be both A and B simultaneously.

In this worldview, the evocation of the rat's essence to be present is an event. It is carried out through music, by the continuous use of rattles shaken to the rhythm of the steps during the ritual.

Thus, the question is less the absurdity of the juxtaposition of man and rat, and more what the rattles do in that ritual: why do the rattles sound? Why do the Kîsêdjê play their rattles? Why is there instrumental music accompanying the chants, even though this instrumental music is so lacking in musical resources? Why do the Kîsêdjê insist on playing them anyway?

The affirmative marking of the present time by the rhythm of the rattles brings the presence of something that was not there before: the ancestral spirit of the rat, to which they sing their evocations; as the Bororo do for the macaws. That is to say, it is not about referring men (subjectively) "to the time of the myth itself," as Seeger states, but about bringing the spirit of the rat (physically) into presence at that present moment. The Kîsêdjê do not say 'I ended up in a distant world where I transform into a rat,' but they

affirm that at that moment they are both man and rat. The Kîsêdjê do not even say they transform into rats. They say that they are men and rats at a given instant (and hence it is a rite of passage, in which the boy is at that time both boy and man). There is no displacement to an ideal plane, as if the Indians were Platonists. There is the coming of a presence from another plane to that physical situation, to that time and space. The instrumental music and the songs make present a reality that was not there before.

The rattles trigger a shift in perspective. Another reality, one that wasn't there before, is now present. There's an overlap of two realities that become physically present, one no more so than the other. It's an overlap without elimination, a transformation not of one into the other, but of 'only one' into 'both'. It's a presentification, that is, a presence that didn't exist before comes into being.

It is music as postulated by Zuckerkandl: “an expansion, an enhancement of the self, a breaking down of the barriers that separate the self from things” (1976, p. 23) and other people. It is music as “the most natural solvent of the artificial boundaries between self and others” (p. 51).

A revision of the concept of human identity based on experiences in relation to music still needs to be written. It would serve as an appropriate basis for addressing the concept of identity in music therapy and psychology.

Music as a manifestation of being in Candomblé and Umbanda.

We find the same situation in another context of Brazilian culture, quite distinct from the previous one. In the rites of possession or incorporation, in Candomblé and Umbanda, music is used with a similar function. These are not indigenous rites. They are urban religious rites performed by blacks and whites, respectively and predominantly. They originate from different sources than the indigenous rites discussed. In them, we find a similar role for music in a completely different context.

In Candomblé, to the sound of the atabaques (a type of percussion instrument), the devotee incorporates or is possessed by an orixá (a deity), with whom he or she is related. However, he or she does not transform into the orixá nor cease to be himself or herself. He or she is simultaneously himself or the orixá, himself or herself or another entity. It is even said that the person becomes more himself or herself upon being possessed by the deity who, in principle, would be an ‘other’. The person becomes “the

custodian of a divine force that must be kept intact” (Cossard, 2011, p. 177), for it is the source of his or her life. He or she is himself or herself in another register, so to speak. The logical impertinence of these statements does not bother the practitioners of the rites, just as it does not bother the Kîsêdjê. Candomblé practitioners practice a perspectivism similar to that of the indigenous people of central Brazil, even though these cultures, in their origin, had no contact with each other.

The percussive rhythm is the driving element that triggers incorporation. In explaining its power in Candomblé ceremonies, sociologist Rosamaria Bárbara states that...

According to mythology, each person is born with a head-owner, who lives in the body through their individual rhythm, their breathing, their gait. This personal rhythm, for various reasons, can be forgotten throughout life. The inner rhythm linked to the orixá, the head-owner, is brought to the surface and definitively fixed in the body through the approach to the religion and more precisely during initiation (1998, p. 8).

The situation is similar, if not identical, in another Brazilian ritual, Umbanda, in which followers incorporate entities considered spiritual, Umbanda having been described in its nature and regarding the role of music in books and articles (Queiroz, 2017; 2015).

In another way and in another context, these are experiences similar to that described for the Kîsêdjê. In both rituals, musical rhythm is the element that makes present an aspect of being originating from another dimension, one that is not visible and tangible. Once again, it is not a matter of representing an ideal level, or elevating subjectivity to another level, but of bringing another reality to the presence experienced in the body. In all these experiences, the body is the means by which the subject experiences the percussive rhythm and, through this, the presence of another being, or another level of being, present in the rhythm and, through the rhythm, in the subject's body.

The rhythmic vibration of the percussive sound produces the experience of presentification in the vivification of lived time. The isochronous rhythm of the Kîsêdjê and the syncopated rhythm of the Candomblé and Umbanda drums, despite their rhythmic and musical differences, lead participants to experience in their bodies the presence of beings that, outside of the rhythmic experience, are not found there.

Rhythm as a living presence

Perhaps the presence of rhythmic music in ceremonies of diverse cultures is due to the presence of a universal rhythmic sonic identity (Benezon, 1988, p. 35; Rouget, 1985, p. xviii) for beings, including those of the human species. The reaffirmation of the present time by the Kîsêdjê and the syncopated displacement of the Candomblé and Umbanda practitioners, as well as other uses of musical rhythm in different rites, lead to the experience of presentification due to the same root: in some way, our psychobiology recognizes in rhythmic vibration another living being, ‘another beating heart’. This is not a means of representing and imagining the presence of another living being, but of effectively perceiving the presence of another living being, without this being a delusion or imagination.

\\If the beings represented by the musical rhythm are incorporeal – be they rats, macaws, or orishas – and if vibration (including sound) is vibratory energy above all else, then it is the vibratory essence of the rat, the macaw, or the orisha that the music makes present – and, if so, this presence is absolutely physical, not representational. It is not a rhythm representing the rat, but the vibration of the rat's spirit that the Kîsêdjê music brings to the Rat Festival, just as it is the essence called orisha, a spirit, that the music of Candomblé makes present to the adept's experience.

Barbara states that the rhythm of the drums not only acts in the incorporation of the orishas, but also that “each orisha has its own unique and original beat that symbolically corresponds... to the natural elements of which it is composed” (1998, p. 9). Other scholars say the same: the vibratory nature of the different rhythms used in Candomblé is the manifestation of each orisha. Roger Bastide states that “the sound rhythms of the drums that accompany them [are the]... leitmotif intended to attract the orishas” (2001, p. 36). Gisèle Cossard states that “the ogãs [percussionists] begin to play rhythms linked to certain deities” (2011, p. 117). Pierre Verger states that “at the beginning of the ceremony, the drums are beaten without the accompaniment of dances and songs, which contributes to highlighting, thanks to this absence of melodic elements, the purity of the rhythm associated with each orixá” (2002, p. 72).

Joseph Moreno, a music therapist, studied Candomblé as a form of therapy and also states that “the rhythms of the drums and chants of the orixás are the main mechanisms for triggering initiates into a state of trance” (1995, p. 230). He highlights the powerful belief system of Candomblé as the means by which it supports people, acting

as a therapeutic tool and providing conditions for altering the consciousness of its followers. Even in his later work (2004), Moreno understands these elements as ritualistic and therapeutic support much more than as a practice of effectively altering reality.

Moreno and Rouget assume that the rhythm of the percussion is the factor that triggers possession in Candomblé, but they do not focus on what happens between the rhythmic music and the internal processes of those who are possessed.

In response to the potential question of why rhythm, present in so many other human manifestations – such as bodily movement in repetitive work – does not promote the same modifications as those postulated for music, we have the argument of musicologist Mário de Andrade, who says that "in music... rhythm presents itself pure, undisguised, undistorted, containing its meaning within itself" (1972, p. 14).

Zuckermandl speaks of music as the temporal art par excellence, "in the special sense that in it time reveals itself to experience" (1973, p. 200, our translation). Music vivifies lived time, the time of the experienced instant, above all, through the body and its sensations. His ideas can serve as an introduction to clarifying why rhythm vivifies time and becomes an active presence.

The effect of music with which we are dealing here, and which in a general way can be called ecstasy, is based much less on tones as such, on melody or harmony, than on rhythm—and specifically on a rhythm specially designed to bring forth the incessantly repeated beat of the metric wave. The listener is caught up in the movement, drawn ever closer to it, and finally carried irresistibly along with it. The phenomenon is not restricted to cases where music serves as a means to an end; it is only displayed more clearly and nakedly there. We always feel this, in varying degrees of intensity, when we listen to music whose structure is metric; it is a basic element of our musical experience; it can become the means of the most powerful artistic effects (1973, p. 174).

And it has one of the most powerful effects on the organization of human identity (Queiroz, 2017, pp. 636-37) and on the relationship that our being establishes with itself through music. But, beyond that, the presence of music brings a new reality existing around us.

Music as an Expression of Being in Music Therapy

The process of making the self present through music is also found in music therapy, a field of experience quite distinct from Brazilian indigenous rites or religious rites of any kind. Its testimony provides identical evidence, from a different perspective. Although the term "presentification" is not used in music therapy, the concept is not foreign to it; on the contrary.

In the Nordoff-Robbins approach, or Creative Music Therapy, the description of Edward's case (Nordoff and Robbins, 1977, pp. 23-36 and the recorded sessions, tracks 1 to 3) illustrates how the music of the music therapist at the piano makes contact with the autistic boy Edward, bringing him into his own presence. Paul Nordoff plays piano chords mirroring the boy's crying, in response to the tones emitted by his crying, since in the first session he only cries. This progressively improvised music leads the boy to respond to the music by modifying and modulating his crying rhythmically and tonally.

He sang - or at least what he did was sing to himself. (...) He directed his singing-weeping ("weeping" because he used his usual weeping voice) in tune with the music, responding to the harmonies, responding to the increases in volume with his own and frequently "placing" his tones rhythmically on the chords or rests (p. 29).

From the fifth session onwards, Edward engages in tonal and rhythmic vocal games, responding to songs played on the piano by the music therapists. Words take shape in the seventh session, when Edward responds 'hello' to the 'Hello song' sung by the music therapists. In the ninth session, Edward sings his name in a descending minor third, vocalizing it in various ways in response to the music played by the therapists. The boy acknowledges his presence by singing his name. Edward makes himself present by singing his name. The music works to bring the boy to his own presence, overcoming the barriers of his limiting condition.

Another paradigmatic case of the Nordoff-Robbins approach is that of Terry, a boy who is also autistic (Aigen, 1998, pp. 81-105, tracks 20 to 35 of CD 1). In the first sessions, he only plays cymbals and drums. Later, when Terry begins to vocalize sung words, the music therapists propose the improvised song in the form of the question "where is Terry?" and the answer "Terry is here." The apex of the process is described by Aigen when...

We hear Terry being encouraged to sing again, while Paul and Clive sing "Terry is___", leaving out the last word. Terry fills in the word "here" in a long melodic tone, singing in the key, and then does it two more times. What is remarkable here is Terry's active musical participation, the conscious awareness that allows him to participate in this way, and the interest in asserting his existence in an expressive and aesthetic manner (p. 96).

Once again, the music brings into the present a being that previously could not or was unable to make itself present. In the case of the two children, this is due to limiting conditions in their psychoneurological structure. In the situations mentioned before, of Candomblé, Umbanda, and the Rat Festival, this is due to another limiting condition, namely, the incorporeality of the beings evoked there.

In music-centered music therapy, we have the case of Luiz Augusto, a boy on the autism spectrum, practically blind and deaf, whose stereotyped movement of swinging his legs with a constant and orderly stable rhythm is the only evident manifestation during the sessions. This movement was matched by the music therapists on the keyboard with the descending Dorian mode, note by note, with small variations, dialoguing with the symmetrical order expressed by the boy's movement. From this, Luiz begins to vocalize and have new expressions, in the setting and with his family, and begins to have a new presence in his life (Queiroz, 2019, pp. 146-47; 153-57).

Music brings the child's being to the forefront of the lived experience in the music therapy process, in both the music-centered and Nordoff-Robbins approaches, just as we have seen occur in religious rites.

In music therapy examples, what is brought to the forefront is the combined work of rhythm, melody, and word – in the joint musical creation of patient and music therapists. However, what essentially occurs here is the same as in the Kîsêdjê rite, in Umbanda and Candomblé: the combination of singing and percussion (between rhythm and melody) opens the doors to a presence that was not previously present. Music operates not as a representative of something, but for the manifestation of being.

Music as presence is, in a way, addressed by music therapists John Carpentre and André Brandalise, who posit a position for it different from that of a 'symbol that communicates'. Based on the Nordoff-Robbins concept of "being in music", they proposed that therapist and patient live and experience themselves as beings in music (Brandalise, 2001, p. 30), creating a diagram in which music, patient, and music therapist occupy the vertices of an equilateral triangle (pp. 30 and 41). In this diagram, music is

not a mediator that interconnects the other two points. Each pole is a vertex of equal power. Music is a presence in itself. It is a third “being” in the music therapy setting. Music itself is a presence, like a being that has needs and acts alongside patient and therapist.

In a way, Aigen conveys the same idea, not from the point of view of music, but of the human being, when he states that "our innermost beings are musically expressed through all our interactions in the world" (2005, p. 131). Not only is music a being, but the human being interacts musically in and with the world. Although music is not a being in the same way as a human being, the musical being and the human being meet as interacting presences.

The emphasis given to melody or rhythm in music in different contexts may relate to their different roles. Perhaps melodic music elevates us to an ideal dimension, while rhythmic music brings the presence of the ideal world to the present moment and place. But these are conjectures.

Music as presence

Paul Valéry states that

Music has its own realm, which is absolutely its own. The world of musical art, the world of sounds, is quite separate from the world of noise... if in this room where I am speaking, where you hear the sound of my voice, a tuning fork or a well-tuned instrument were to begin to vibrate... you would have the sensation of a beginning, the beginning of a world; a different atmosphere would be immediately created, a new order would be announced, your attention would be organized to receive it (2007, p. 202).

Music “adds to our stock of reality” (Zuckerkandl, 1976, p. 337, our translation).

Music is a driving force, a living presence, and as such, it is a presence that relates to other human presences in the environment where it plays. This relationship is established between the presence of music and the being of people. This relationship triggers the manifestation of the being of people, that aspect of the human that precedes, grounds, and is the creative source of the manifest aspects of personality. This is what Robbins & Robbins call "the being-within-the-self" in which "lives the potential for creative development" (1991, p. 56).

In her presentation of music-centered music therapy, Aigen uses the classic comparison between movement and music to bring music and human life closer together, stating that they “are connected through the phenomenon of movement” (2005, p. 265) and develops several correlations between musical forms and forms of organization and personality formation: structure and freedom, tension and release, change and transformation (p. 267-68) to illustrate the formal (aesthetic) analogies from which music acts therapeutically.

What I seek to argue in this article is that the relationship between music and human beings precedes their formal correlations. Such correlations are a consequence of a fundamental affinity and not the cause of the strong connection between music and human beings.

The formal aspects of music are undoubtedly important and should be used for the intended purposes in the music therapy process and in evocative rites. But there is something prior to the various possible musical forms that is at the heart of its role, including in music therapy.

Brian Abrams sought a definition of music in an author as ancient as Boetius, regaining the freedom to consider music “as a living principle of humanity itself” (2011, p. 115) and thereby re-proposing the meaning of music in the general theory of music therapy (p. 118). Music as presence and presentification brings encouragement similar to the meaning of music in music therapy and in all human activity.~

Music is a presence that precedes and primarily represents this or that. The presence of music is of a vibrational order, which does not mean something incorporeal, but of such a nature that, although corporeal, it has an active presence not as a visible and tangible body, but as something whose body is neither seen nor touched directly.

The vibratory nature of music is its peculiar way of being present in the world —, so to speak, an ‘incorporeal corporeality’. And if it has an active presence; if when there is music, time itself reveals itself; if its forces act palpably in the pure presence of rhythm, so as to fulfill the role of making present in various human activities, all this does not mean that its role as a symbol capable of representation can be discarded or cease to exist.

Music is an event in the external world, opening doors to a new reality and a new being. This concept is expressed by the fact that in the most diverse cultures there is no religious or spiritual practice absent from musical practice. When considering the possibility of contact with another realm, music plays an important role. However, the relationship between music and religion, or spirituality, is still an open question.

Aigen quotes Sylvan when he states

that certain forms of popular music constellate religious experiences for the public, but as conventional wisdom regards pop music styles as "trivial forms of secular entertainment" (p. 3), their religious dimensions are marginalized, hidden from view, and misunderstood (2005, p. 287).

Music, as a presence that connects with our being, helps us understand why it awakens us to the spiritual dimension. When we open ourselves to it in a certain way, it connects us with essential aspects of our being, possibly that aspect within us that faces the spiritual planes.

While the question of music as presence may not be important when making music for entertainment or aesthetic purposes – after all, music has thrived for many centuries in the West as a mode of representation – in music therapy, the fact that musical sounds primarily refer to being redefines the core role of music in this practice.

In music therapy, considering music as a presence, as an event that conducts forces, points to it as a stimulus for the manifestation of the self, or aspects of the self, that were not previously manifest; it allows music to transform and update a person's identity, even overcoming existing barriers in the already formed identity. Music contacts the self from its root and causes it to manifest new ways of being, more than just facilitating readjustments on the rigid surface of our personalities. The terms music child and condition child (Robbins & Robbins, 1991, p. 57) refer to these dimensions, deep and superficial, of the self.

To posit music as a driving force event may sound similar to Alfred Gell's (2018) assertion that art is an agent, something that acts. However, there is a fundamental difference: for Gell, art acts but is not a being, and its action occurs at the level of socially constructed stimuli and responses. I have sought to show that music relates directly to the innermost aspects of being, far beyond the stimulus-response relationship and social constructs, as Paul Nordoff also affirms (Robbins & Robbins, 1998, p. 137).

Abrams' statement, when seeking a definition of music for music therapy, that it is necessary to "understand music-based music therapy as a mode of being, transcending music as a means" (2011, p. 118), converges with the meaning of music that I have sought to convey. Experiencing music as a being in the music therapy setting is to take it as a mode of being, but it is also to establish a relationship with it that awakens my being with greater wholeness than occurs in other human practices, whether artistic or not.

The total relationship between the human being and the being of music (more than emotional, aesthetic, and representational correlations) is the starting point I propose for thinking about music in music therapy. The role of the body, for example, in this total relationship is as important as, or even more important than, that of subjectivity and the abstract mind, as the examples presented in this text show.

The various modes of being of music – representation, aesthetic form, communion, musical making, presentification, and presence – are not mutually exclusive. Sometimes one, sometimes another, sometimes several modes operate, to some extent, according to the context and the meaning with which the music is made. However, I consider that when music sounds, its primary power is to be a living presence and to have the capacity to make beings present.

In a lecture at the Eranos Circle in 1961, Zuckerkandl made the following statement: "It is easily understood how words refer to things, but it remains obscure how and why sounds refer to being" (2004, pp. 178-79). The distinct human activities presented here—the being of the child, the rat, the orisha, and other entities that are initially incorporeal—which manifest themselves with the presence of music—outline an answer to this question, which astonishes Zuckerkandl himself, saying that "then the assertion that music belongs to the being of things is revealed as monstrous" (p. 180).

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